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WITHDRAWING FROM CUSTOM AND THE
PARADOX OF CONSENSUALISM IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW
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INTRODUCTION
In their excellent article, Withdrawing from International Custom,
Professors Curtis Bradley and Mitu Gulati call into question the prevailing
conception of customary international law, according to which states
“never have the legal right to withdraw unilaterally from customary law”
(the “Mandatory View”).1 Bradley and Gulati question the intellectual
history and functional desirability of the Mandatory View, and they
identify “significant uncertainties about how the Mandatory View would
work in practice.”2 Their observations appear to us to be convincing. If the
basis of the Mandatory View is not convincing, then its main tenets, such
as the absence of a right of withdrawal, must also fall. Without focusing
directly on the question of whether there exists a right of unilateral
withdrawal from customary international law, we have also previously
rejected the prevailing conception of customary international law on other
grounds.3 In this paper, we will amplify a number of issues we had raised
in our critique of the prevailing view. We will sketch a consensual
explanation of customary international law that is based on how states
argue about international custom. We will argue that taking empiricism
seriously means eschewing literal readings of state practice. It means doing
more than focusing on what states say about what they do, and instead
examining what they actually do. We will argue that such a consensual
explanation provides a better context in which to examine the question of
withdrawal from custom.
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1. Curtis A. Bradley & Mitu Gulati, Withdrawing from International Custom, 120 YALE L.J. 202
(2010).
2. See generally id.
3. O.A. ELIAS & C.L. LIM, THE PARADOX OF CONSENSUALISM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1998).
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I. RULES ABOUT CUSTOM AS RULES OF CUSTOM
A discussion of the conditions under which withdrawal from
customary law is permissible is necessarily a discussion of the nature of the
rules that govern the operation of customary law (such as the rules on how
customary law rights and obligations are created and changed). The
question that arises here has been posed as follows: “Do propositions about
the sources of law require empirical support? Or, on the contrary, is
deduction from a set of postulates that define the international legal order a
sufficient basis for their validity?”4 In other words, how does one establish
whether withdrawal from custom is or is not permissible? Is there a
difference between the way in which the law on permissibility of
withdrawal, or on the effect of persistent objection, is to be established, on
the one hand, and the way in which ordinary substantive rules of custom
are proved, on the other?5
The predominant view today provides the following affirmative
answer: “A persistent objector rule makes the applicable customary
international law rule depend on timely, actual and persistent dissent to a
general rule on the part of the objecting state, but applying a general rule of
custom (i.e. an ordinary substantive rule) to a state does not require the
consent of that state to that general rule.” This view would run into
problems since the latter application of a customary international law rule
depends neither on non-dissent nor consent on the part of that state where
such non-dissent or consent would at least be empirically verifiable. What
is left instead is a form of deduction. Deduction from a set of postulates
that cannot be traced to a positivist source of law can be authoritative as
accurate prescription only up to a point. If international practice—in
statements made by states explaining their actions, or in judicial
decisions—supports something different from conclusions based on the
reasoning of scholars, the validity and the usefulness of those conclusions
would be called into serious question. The fact is that states and tribunals,
applying international law, refer to empirically verifiable criteria—i.e.
practice and opinio juris—to establish the existence of rules of customary
law.6 If there is law on how customary law changes, as indeed there must
be, the best way (or at least a very important way) to know its content is to

4. Ted L. Stein, The Approach of the Different Drummer: The Principle of the Persistent
Objector in International Law, 26 HARV. INT’L L.J. 457, 461 n.13 (1985).
5. For excellent recent discussion of issues surrounding this problem, see Jörg Kammerhofer,
Uncertainty in the Formal Sources of International Law: Customary International Law and Some of Its
Problems, 15 EUR. J. INT’L L. 523 (2004).
6. See Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38(1)(b), June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, 3
Bevans 1179.
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refer to the practice of those who make and identify the law.7 In this sense,
empiricism has instructive value even if there is some other, better way of
ascertaining the truth of propositions of law regarding the operation of
custom.
However, such international practice, which empiricism upholds as a
criterion for legal validity, can be read in two different ways. First, it can be
read literally, i.e., it can be read with a view to finding a literal answer in
what states say about what they do, to questions such as: Is there a
persistent objector rule? What are the conditions for qualification as a
persistent objector? How widespread must practice be for it to lead to a
new custom? When, if ever, can a state withdraw from customary law?
Second, it can be read in context, with a view to finding out what states
actually do. We will begin with the first.
II. CONCEPTIONS OF THE ROLE OF CONSENT IN CUSTOMARY
LAW: THE INCOHERENCE OF THE PERSISTENT OBJECTOR
THEORY
The discussion of a right to withdraw from customary international
law is a discussion of the right to withdraw consent to a particular rule of
customary law; withdrawal is surely an act of will. The discussion is
therefore about the role of consent in customary international law viewed
from a particular aspect. A number of conceptions of the role of consent in
customary international law have been expressed.8 These conceptions range
from those at one end of the spectrum according to which, for various
reasons, the consent or practice of states plays a minimal role,9 to those at

7. See, e.g., A.V. Lowe, Do General Rules of International Law Exist?, 9 REV. INT’L STUD. 207,
209 (1983) (“The secondary rule of law-creation will itself be a rule of customary international law
derived from state practice . . . .”); K. Venkata Raman, Toward a General Theory of International
Customary Law, in TOWARD WORLD ORDER AND HUMAN DIGNITY: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF MYRES S.
MCDOUGAL 365, 367 (W. Michael Reisman & Burns H. Weston eds., 1976) (“[T]he so-called preexisting rule of law, entailing legal obligation by customary practice, is itself a product of customary
practice.”); JAN H.W. VERZIJL, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 32 (1968) (“[I]n any
legal order, the question regarding the birth of customary law must be answered in accordance with the
positive . . . law obtaining in it in respect of the formation of law.”); LOUIS HENKIN, INTERNATIONAL
LAW: POLITICS & VALUES 32 (1995) (“The norm governing the making of customary law—the
requirement of consistent general practice plus opinio juris—is based on the constitutional conceptions
of the State system, but developed by custom.”). For a contrary view, see Kammerhofer, supra note 5,
at 545 (arguing that the method of looking to State practice plus opinio juris to answer this question is
flawed because it “presupposes a method of proof which itself is the object of the investigation”).
8. ELIAS & LIM, supra note 3, at 29-33.
9. See, e.g., International Status of South-West Africa, Advisory Opinion, 1950 I.C.J. 174, at
175-78 (July 11) (dissenting opinion of Judge Alvarez); Lazare Kopelmanas, Custom as a Means of the
Creation of International Law, 18 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 148 (1937); Georges Scelle, Règles générales du
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the other end according to which no general rule of customary international
law will arise if some states, or maybe a state, objects to that rule.10 These
conceptions do not enjoy support in practice or in academic opinion.11
Two other conceptions enjoy greater support. The first holds that rules
of customary international law are created by a system of majority rule
(whatever the required majority may be), and that the fact that an individual
state has not accepted or has never objected to this rule does not prevent the
applicability of the rule to that state.12 A variant of this conception makes
an exception and holds that while customary international law applies to all
states, it will not be applicable to persistent objectors, i.e., states that have
unequivocally and consistently manifested their dissent from the rule
during its formation. Subsequent objectors, however, are bound. Both
variants of this conception cover what Bradley and Gulati describe as the
Mandatory View—”mandatory” because there is no right to withdraw
unilaterally from custom once it is established.13 A second conception
holds that rules of customary international law are “not applicable to a
particular state unless that state has in some way consented to that rule”
(the “consensual theory”).14 According to this view, a general customary
rule is only an aggregate of individual acts of consent.15 While the
assumption in the Mandatory View is that a rule of custom applies to all
states, the starting point in the consensual theory is the consent of the
individual state against whom the rule of custom in question is sought to be
applied.
Empirical observation has led to the conclusion that the practice of
states regarding the role of consent in the customary international law
process has not been uniform because states have expressed different views

droit de la paix, 46 RECUEIL DES COURS 434 (1933-IV) (Neth.); Louis Le Fur, Règles générales du
droit de la paix, 54 RECUEIL DES COURS 198 (1935) (Neth.).
10. See, e.g., S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 103 (Sep. 7) (dissenting
opinion of Judge Altamira’s) ; Fisheries Jurisdiction (U.K. v. Ice.), 1974 I.C.J. 3 at 89-90 (July 25)
(separate opinion of Judge de Castro) (“For an international custom to come into existence, the fact that
a rule may be adopted by several States in their municipal legislation, in treaties and conventions, or
may be applied in arbitral decisions is not sufficient, if other States adopt a different rule.”).
11. ELIAS & LIM, supra note 3, at 37-38.
12. See, e.g., Bin Cheng, Custom: The Future of General State Practice in a Divided World, in
THE STRUCTURE AND PROCESS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 513, 531-32 (Ronald St. J. Macdonald &
David M. Johnston eds., 1983); Jonathan I. Charney, The Persistent Objector Rule and the Development
of Customary International Law, 56 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 1, 1-2 (1985); Luigi Condorelli, Custom, in
INTERNATIONAL LAW: ACHIEVEMENTS AND PROSPECTS 179, 202-07 ( Mohammed Bedjaoui ed., 1991).
13. The difference between the two variants in this conception is that, according to the first
variant, the persistent objector theory does not have a basis in practice or in principle.
14. ELIAS & LIM, supra note 3, at 31.
15. See id. at 130-34.
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on the matter.16 Furthermore, the manner in which states argue about
customary international law is complex, and the context in which such
claims are made is perhaps more illuminating than the claims themselves.
We shall return to this issue in the next section. In the meantime, two
pertinent propositions can be put forward. The first is that, as has been
recognized by a significant body of opinion, “in the absence of clearly
established general rules, the legal issue has continued to present itself in
terms of the opposability of the claim to [an]other state rather than of the
absolute legality or illegality of the claim erga omnes; in other words, in
terms of the acceptance or acquiescence of other states.”17 The second is
that commentators have invariably noted the paucity of examples of practice
or judicial decisions supporting the persistent objector rule, and with it the
Mandatory View.18 Consent is central to the creation of customary law
obligations, but that consent is not the version proffered by the Mandatory
View and the persistent objector theory.
The difference between the consensual theory and the Mandatory View
with regard to the role of state consent is that the Mandatory View conditions

16. Id. at 112-113. See also, e.g., Ielbo M. Lobo de Souza, The Role of State Consent in the
Customary Process, 44 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 521, 539 (1995) (“[T]here is not a common view among the
States about the idea of consent and its role in the customary process . . . it is not at all clear how precisely
each State perceives it . . . . The first conclusion one could formulate is that there is no rule which prescribes
that the consent of all States is a necessary condition to the formation of a general customary rule. The
second conclusion is that there is no universally recognized rule which would replace the ‘all consent’
rule.”). See also Hidemi Suganami, A.V. Lowe on General Rules of International Law, 10 REV. INT’L. STUD.
175, 175 (1984) (“It seems somewhat doubtful that an investigation into state practice can reveal
conclusively whether, according to the secondary rule, a generally accepted rule of customary law is binding
on a state unless it persistently objects, or whether a state, unless it is a persistent objector, is presumed to
have consented to it, and is therefore bound by it.”).
17. Fisheries Jurisdiction (U.K. v. Ice.), 1974 I.C.J. 3, ¶ 35 (July 25) (separate opinion of Judge
Sir Humphrey Waldock). See also ELIAS & LIM, supra note 3, ch. VI; IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 12 (6th ed. 2003) (explaining that in the absence of a general practice,
customary law becomes “a network of special relations based on opposability, acquiescence, and
historic title”); ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN A DIVIDED WORLD 346-347 (1986); Lowe,
supra note 7, at 209-11; Donald W. Greig, Reflections on the Role of Consent, 7 AUSTL. Y.B. INT’L L.
125, 173 (1988-89) (“If, as seems to be generally accepted, a new or different rule can become
established amongst a regional or other grouping of States in derogation from the general rule, there
would seem to be no reason in theory why the same should not be true in reverse. It is perfectly possible
for a group of States to adhere to a former rule in the face of evidence of State conduct moving towards
acceptance of a new rule. Indeed, the new rule may well become established amongst the States
adhering to it. Admittedly this creates difficulties in determining the rule to be applied in relations
between States promoting different rules to a particular situation. However, this is not an uncommon
problem.”); Michael Akehurst, Custom as a Source of International Law, 47 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 1, 30
(1974-75).
18. Charney, supra note 12, and Stein, supra note 4, at 459, both underline the paucity of
examples of the application of the persistent objector rule. See also O. Elias, Persistent Objector, in
MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, para. 18 (2009).
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the operation of consent on a number of formalities, namely, actual dissent,
timeliness and persistence. But problems arise largely because the Mandatory
View demands and assumes a high degree of legal certainty in the operation
of customary law. However, such certainty is notoriously lacking, both in
relation to the formation of customary law and in relation to the content of the
persistent objector rule itself. First, the difficulties in knowing when a rule of
customary law comes into existence are well-known and have been discussed
extensively.19 There is no certainty regarding the requirements of generality,
consistency and uniformity of the practice required of the rule. The difficulties
with the subjective element, opinio juris, are even more notorious. In addition,
customary law is an ever-evolving process of claim and response.20 Even in
areas where there might be said to be settled general rules, these rules are
constantly being added to and subtracted from.21 These considerations deprive
the so-called persistent objector rule of its intended utility, as the exercise of
the right to dissent depends on the existence of a general rule from which to
dissent. Is dissent supposed to be expressed from the earliest articulations of a
nascent rule, at the time of creation, or soon thereafter? Then how persistent,
and consistent, must the persistent objector be?22 These ill-defined formal
requirements do not feature in a true consensual explanation, which looks to
whether there has been some kind of consent.
Further problems exist. The persistent objector rule is meant to be the
safeguard for the essentially democratic and consensual nature of customary
law.23 The rule gives states the chance to exempt themselves from a rule of
customary law before that rule is established and, presumably in the interests
of legal certainty, states cannot exempt themselves thereafter.24 But equating
19. See, e.g., Henkin, supra note 7, at 29-31.
20. See Myres S. McDougal, The Hydrogen Bomb Tests and the International Law of the Sea, 49 AM.
J. INT’L L. 356, 356-57 (1955).
21. See generally, Maurice H. Mendelson, State Acts and Omissions as Explicit or Implicit
Claims, in LE DROIT INTERNATIONAL AU SERVICE DE LA PAIX, DE LA JUSTICE ET DU DÉVELOPPEMENT
373 (Mélanges Michel Virally ed., 1991).
22. See generally David A. Colson, How Persistent Must the Persistent Objector Be?, 61 WASH.
L. REV. 957 (1986).
23. COMMITTEE ON THE FORMATION OF CUSTOMARY (GENERAL) INTERNATIONAL LAW,
INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION, STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES APPLICABLE TO THE FORMATION OF
GENERAL CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 28 (2000) [hereinafter ILA REPORT] (“As a matter of
policy, the persistent objector rule could be regarded as a useful compromise. It respects States’
sovereignty and protects them from having new law imposed on them against their will by a majority;
but at the same time, if the support for the new rule is sufficiently widespread, the convoy of the law’s
progressive development can move forward without having to wait for the slowest vessel.”).
24. States which simultaneously advocate the persistent objector rule and the Mandatory View
enjoy the benefit of a useful and flexible tool. While the persistent objector rule allows a state to
withdraw from a general rule and adopt an isolationist legal policy when it is unable to influence the
formation of a general rule, the Mandatory View (which the persistent objector rule assumes) also
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the role of consent with—or more accurately, replacing it by—the ill-defined
conditions of the persistent objector rule renders it incoherent, and there is
much that is counter-intuitive in the Mandatory View.25
Those who subscribe to the Mandatory View hold that a state’s consent
is not required for it to be bound by a rule of customary law, but they
nevertheless uphold the persistent objector theory.26 This involves
maintaining a distinction between a silent state and a dissenting state; the
former is bound by a general rule, but the latter is not. If a state is bound by a
rule of custom in spite of its dissent, there must be a system of majority rule in
customary international law; but the entire rationale for the persistent objector
rule is that there is no system of majority rule. This is because state will is an
important criterion, if not the main criterion, in the process of customformation. But if state will is the criterion, it should be the criterion for all
states, whether they are silent or dissenting states. So why do silent states find
themselves in a different situation from dissenting states under the Mandatory
View/persistent objector theory? The explanation provided appears to be that
states are given the chance, and the legal burden, to exempt themselves during
the permissible period, and that that is the extent of the role allowed for their
individual consent. The difficulty with this explanation is that it is counterintuitive to see how customary international law, an informal process, is
reduced by the persistent objector theory to a system requiring early
notification of views as if it were a process containing readily identifiable and
applicable criteria.27 Furthermore, the persistent objector rule means that
states have agreed between themselves to set up a system that denies them the
option of remaining neutral. The persistent objector rule apparently

enables that state to project its own preferred rule as the general rule whenever it is likely to succeed in
doing so.
25. See, for example, Stein, supra note 4, at 477-78, which points out a further problem with the
persistent objector theory. It is sometimes said to be premised on a theory of vested or acquired rights or
interests. Because it requires there to be a general rule, however, it goes against the principle of
intertemporal law, which requires, at least in some of its versions that the validity, not just of the
acquisition of a right, but also of its continued existence, be conditioned by the evolution of law. If the
general rule (a condition precedent for the operation of the persistent objector theory), which is binding
on all states, means that the universal law on a given issue is changed, the continued existence of the
persistent dissenter's acquired rights will become dependent on the new law, and it will be trying to seek
exemption from the application of the general rule. This problem would be much reduced for the
consensual theory, since it does not depend on the existence of a general rule, but on individual
positions adopted by states.
26. See, e.g., Akehurst, supra note 17; ILA REPORT, supra note 23, at 30.
27. MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY TO UTOPIA: THE STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL
LEGAL ARGUMENT 444-45 (1989) (“Even if the State is hard pressed so as not to be able to deny the
inter alios existence of the norm, it will still have the possibility of qualifying itself as a persistent
objector as it may argue that it learned about the norm (or that the norm was intended to apply in
respect of it, too) only now and thus voice its ‘objection’ at the moment of application.”).
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encourages states to dissent as early as possible even if in doubt, and
presumably even in circumstances in which the realities of international
relations may render such objections unusual or unpopular.28 This, again,
neither accords with intuition nor appears to reflect how states behave.
Surely if states claim the right to dissent, it is because they do not wish to
be bound by rules they find unacceptable, and they therefore do not wish to
subscribe to majority rule. This surely cannot be taken to mean that states
wish to be bound if they are silent or uninterested or do not wish to commit
themselves one way or another for practical-political reasons, or if they
commence their dissent too late. As Charney, an avowed non-consensualist,
has put it, “[g]overnment officials are jealous of their state’s sovereignty and
autonomy and are loath to adopt rules that bind dissenters. For they know that
at some point their state may be on the dissenting side of the issue.”29 To say
that the very existence of a right to dissent confirms the existence of a rule
that states are bound unless they are persistent objectors is to take state
practice too literally. Such an assumption gives too much import to what
states say about what they do and the moments when they do not say
anything, as opposed to what states actually do and understand themselves to
be doing. The fact that states claim a right to dissent does not necessarily
imply that they normally mean to be bound without their consent, and a
general consensual explanation of the role of dissent makes much more sense
than the explanation provided by the persistent objector theory. As one
commentator, has put it, the right to dissent cannot be regarded as “merely an
annex in the general theory of custom,”30 which is precisely the role the
persistent objector theory ascribes to it.
III. THE WAY STATES ARTICULATE CLAIMS ABOUT
CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW
It has been argued that a consensual explanation is not convincing
because it does not reflect the reality of the way in which states make claims
about customary international law. 31 States, and tribunals, do not normally
28. See ELIAS & LIM, supra note 3, at 96-97.
29. Jonathan I. Charney, Universal International Law, 87 AM. J. INT’L L. 529, 550 (1993).
30. KOSKENNIEMI, supra note 27, at 443.
31. ILA REPORT, supra note 23, at 24 (“[n]o international court or tribunal has ever refused to hold
that a State was bound by a rule of alleged general customary international merely because it had not
itself actively participated in the practice in question or deliberately acquiesced in it. In other words, it
is not necessary to prove the individual consent of a State for it to be bound by a rule of general law.
There have been several cases in which the International Court, for instance, has taken it for granted
that the State concerned would be bound by the rule if it could be shown that the other criteria for the
formation of general customary law were satisfied. This is also generally the position taken by States,
and there have been no substantial challenges to this proposition.”).
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concern themselves with demonstrating individual consent, and focus instead
on the establishment of generally applicable rules to support their position. In
many cases, they leave it at that, and do not refer to the consent of the state
against which the rule is to be applied. As has been argued, the whole reason
why so much time is spent trying to establish the generality of a practice
would seem to be the fact that if it is established, the rule having that attribute
will be binding on all. The normal way in which arguments are formulated
before the International Court, for example, is by one party arguing that a
practice is sufficiently general, and therefore that custom exists, which
consequently binds the other state who has in fact consented to it. The other
party will normally argue that the rule is not sufficiently general, and as a
result does not exist, thus is not binding on it, and that in any case it has not
consented to the rule and has even dissented therefrom. This has happened,
for example, in every case before the International Court in which the
requirements of customary law were scrutinized. 32 But this is not a feature
only of the pleadings before international tribunals; diplomatic
correspondence normally refers to “generally accepted rules,” or even
“established international law,” and domestic legislation purports to be based
on rights conferred by international law.33 What are the implications of this
form of argumentation for the consensual theory? Let us consider the issue
from the point of view of the state that denies the application of a rule to itself.
Such a state can do one of two things. First, it may concede that there is a rule,
but maintain that that rule is not binding on it. Second, rather than denying its
scope or applicability, the state may deny the existence of the rule itself. Now,
as far as that state is concerned, it is not (or at least it seeks to show that it is
not) under an obligation, whether on the basis of the absence of a rule or on
the basis of the non-applicability of the rule to itself. It would seem to be a
legitimate inference to conclude that the state denying the
existence/applicability of a custom has not consented to that custom; the fact
that that consent is sufficient (even if not necessary) to bind a state is not
contested. It would appear to be a question of argumentative strategy.
Showing that a rule does not exist, as a means of avoiding obligations
imposed by that rule, is more convincing and less difficult to concede than
showing that the rule exists but that for some reason—such as lack of
consent—that rule is not applicable. It is safer to present one’s view as the
orthodox view, and not to portray oneself as the dissident.34 To recall a well-

32.
33.
34.
validity,

See generally ELIAS & LIM, supra note 3, ch. III.
Id. at 110-11.
See KOSKENNIEMI, supra note 27, at 444 (“The objection may concern the norm’s erga omnes
not merely its application . . . . These States deny that any such custom has emerged. It is
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known example from the 1980s, the United States did not deny a customary
law obligation to refrain from unilateral exploitation of the ocean floor on the
basis of its persistent objection; the United States argued that there was no
such customary law.35 Our forensic sensibilities suggest that a more searching
view and acute understanding of state practice on the recognition of
customary rules is required. Our experience about the actual conduct of
international diplomacy should also feature in our understanding of state
practice because of what such experience will tell us about the unspoken
habits which states observe when contesting a customary rule. Such habits are
in turn an element of state practice.
For the reasons above, it would seem strange to suggest that arguing on
the basis of a right to dissent is necessarily a concession to majority rule.36 A
state is merely seeking to avoid an obligation; the lack of precision as to what
amounts to a general custom, or a perceived high standard of proof for the
establishment of a restrictive rule, would seem to be attractive avenues to
achieving this end.37 The persistent objector rule is less attractive.
In sum, it is doubtful whether a state that denies the existence of a
general rule is really manifesting opinio juris to the effect that all rules
supported by general practice are binding on all states, including itself.
Arguing that a rule does not exist in no way necessarily implies that if that
rule did exist, it would be binding. The whole point of arguing in that way is
to show the state involved does not: (a) recognize the obligations flowing
from that rule; or (b) has not accepted the rule. The argument between states
about customary law is not disinterested dialogue. Claims made in concrete
cases about customary law must be viewed in the context in which they were
made, being mindful always of the purpose and meaning behind the ways in
which states contest customary rules.

because the objection can always be formulated in such a manner that we remain incapable of
delimiting the category of persistent objectors.”).
35. See statement of Ambassador Elliott Richardson, in THIRD UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON
THE LAW OF THE SEA, OFFICIAL RECORDS, Vol. IX, (1982) 103-04 (“But the United States could not
accept the suggestion that, without its consent, other States would be able, by resolutions or statements,
to deny or alter its rights under international law.” He also stated, concerning resolution 27/49, that it
was apparent from the text, and from statements made at the time of its adoption, that “the intention had
not been to impose it as an interim deep-sea bed mining régime, rather it had been intended as a general
basis for further negotiation of an internationally agreed régime.”).
36. Lobo de Souza, supra note 16, at 533.
37. Serge Sur, Discussion, in CHANGE AND STABILITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW-MAKING 127 (Antonio
Cassese & Joseph H. Weiler eds., 1988) (“There are cases where a custom is itself the object of dispute,
where its applicability is directly at issue, where the parties do not agree as to the opposability of the rule.
When the Court is faced with such a hypothesis, it indisputably gives the palm . . . to the consensualist
solution. But when it has to do with customs which are not in dispute, customs which are simply an element
in its reasoning, it utilises them in a much more flexible manner.”).
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Regarding withdrawal, a state that does not wish to have a given rule of
custom applied to it will not typically say “[t]his is the law that everyone
accepts, but we will now withdraw from it” (“where everyone would
recognize that what we are doing is that we are withdrawing from it”). A state
is more likely to argue that there is no general custom requiring conduct to
which it does not wish to subscribe, and would most likely argue in favour of
a rule that supports its preferred course of action.38
IV. CONSENSUALISM THEN AND NOW
The complex way in which states argue about the basis of customary
international law does not appear to be properly explained by those who
claim empirical support for the Mandatory View.
We must depart from the usual doctrinal explanations and canonical
understandings. Part of what we have said about the complex ways in
which states argue about the basis of customary international law is
attributable to the inherent vagueness of legal rules.39 It is precisely because
legal certainty is notoriously lacking when dealing with contestation over
customary rules that the Mandatory View is attractive. The Mandatory
View’s doctrines and canons provide hope and a verisimilitude of certainty
while at all times appearing, facially at least, to comport with what states
say about what they do. Yet the Mandatory View’s explanations cloud our
understanding of the true facts of how states actually go about recognizing
customary rules. We also question the suppression of the infinite variety of
contexts in which customary law disputes occur.40 What makes the basis of
customary international law extremely complex for scholars is that the
conditions under which withdrawal can take place are often caught up in
legal interpretative dispute. In such a context, states will not argue for the
existence of inconvenient rules, or for the truth of inconvenient legal
interpretations. A further complication is that states do not always say what
they mean, or mean what they say. In so doing, they do not mean to deny
the existence of a legal rule when they mean instead to deny the application
of that rule to themselves, but they may say that they do in order to make
their case more compelling. Understanding such facts about state behavior
means accepting that states do not necessarily take the Mandatory View
seriously to be the theoretical basis of customary international law, as
38. See Maurice H. Mendelson, Practice, Propaganda and Principle in International Law, in 42
1989 1, 9 (Roger Rideout & Jeffery Jowell ed., 1990) (“[I]f you can present
your demand as an existing right, it is the other government who would ostensibly be disturbing the
status quo by denying it, and not by you making the demand.”).
39. ELIAS & LIM, supra note 3, at 69, 259-60, 289-92.
40. Id. at 261.
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opposed to being sometimes a convenient fiction about how customary
international law is formed.
While we recognize some of the merits in having a widespread
acceptance of the Mandatory View—i.e., that it facilitates law creation and
the ability to make general statements of what “the law” is—we also
consider the need for simplicity. In our opinion, there is much to commend
the view that international law scholarship should focus on the central
methodological importance of establishing the opposability of a customary
rule to a particular state without always having to address complex
questions about general customary international law. This requires a reorientation of how we think about the importance of international law. If
one is concerned with the human rights situation in Country X, is it really
more important to demonstrate that a large number of countries support a
particular human rights rule than to demonstrate that the rule in question
applies to Country X? It may be important to the cause of advocating
human rights protection to say that a large number of countries accept the
rule in question (“We all accept the rule, yet Country X denies its
existence”), and the Mandatory View may have rhetorical value in this
respect, but it is not strictly important as a matter of legal doctrine to prove
either that a large number of countries accept the rule or that such a broadly
accepted rule therefore applies to “silent” states.
Because we were content to show that the Mandatory View is
conceptually flawed in this way, and theoretically superfluous, we neither
tried to define the scope for subsequent state “exit” (i.e. subsequent
objection) as closely as Professor Andrew Guzman has tried to do,41 nor
did we address the policy desirability of the Mandatory View on rule of law
or other grounds as Professors Bradley and Gulati have done. Similarly, we
did not invest in the protection of expectations as a justification for the
Mandatory View as we were not sure who would decide what these
expectations are, and whether we mean to derive an a priori “expectation”
from the collective silence of a large number of states.42
Instead, we directed our analysis at the purpose or point which states
have ascribed to custom and the invocation of customary rules.43 This
question is fundamental and explains the current polarization of scholarly
opinion between those who advocate a skeptical theory of customary

41. Andrew T. Guzman, Saving Customary International Law, 27 MICH. J. INT’L L. 115, 170-71
(2005).
42. ELIAS & LIM, supra note 3, at 83-84.
43. Id. at 267; see also, RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE (1986).
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international law,44 and those who support the systemic rule of law and
policy concerns underlying the Mandatory View. At one end, state practice
is seen only as bare self-interested behavior,45 while at the other end, the
Mandatory View’s systemic concerns leads its proponents towards a
majoritarian,46 or even a deductive theory of customary international law47
(some versions of which do not even accept the importance of state practice
and thus do not allow for understanding such practice). One promising
approach seeks to avoid these extremes by drawing our attention back to
the central importance of accounting for actual state behavior, while
maintaining fidelity to customary international law scholarship’s traditional
concern—i.e., the need to understand how states might actually act in a
cooperative manner under color of law.48 This approach is derived from the
behavioral preoccupations of economic analysis.
Our view proceeds from a separate stream of legal thought altogether;
one which takes questions about meaning and legal uncertainty seriously.
While states may disregard, acknowledge as obligatory and/or follow
general customary rules, they also contest the scope and meaning of
customary rules. Unlike the Mandatory View, however, we see customary
international law certainty as something which is inherently problematic.
When contesting the scope and purpose of a rule, states may not always
express the theories they hold about how a rule of custom comes into place.
In any case, they may have different theories about how custom is
formed.49 A final complication is that a state which finds it disagreeable to
dissent constantly has reasons based in argumentative strategy to present its
attempt to modify a supposed general rule to suit its circumstances as a
denial of a general customary rule instead. In either case, such a state does
not concede the existence of a general rule, i.e., by seeming to claim a right
to dissent therefrom. Thus, what is claimed is the need for consent.
Demonstrating that the Mandatory View is conceptually flawed, or
that its picture of how states behave is incomplete and misleading, is not
the only task at hand for contemporary customary international law
44. Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, A Theory of Customary International Law, 66 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1113 (1999).
45. Id.
46. See, e.g., Cheng, supra note 12, at 531-532; Charney, supra note 12, at 1-2; Condorelli, supra
note 12, at 202-207.
47. See, e.g., International Status of South-West Africa, 150 I.C.J. 174,175-178; Kopelmanas,
supra note 9; Scelle, supra note 9; Le Fur, supra note 9.
48. See JOEL P. TRATCHMAN, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2008), 113
(“CIL rules may be coterminous with self-interest.”).
49. ELIAS & LIM, supra note 3, at 95, 112-113. See de Souza, supra note 16, at 539; Suganami,
supra note 16, at 175.
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scholarship. Recent efforts have contributed significantly to furthering our
understanding of what it means, in policy terms, to reject the Mandatory
View. Professors Bradley’s and Gulati’s important article on withdrawal
from custom stands out as a fine example of that contribution.

